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REVISITING THE NAV Y’S MOR AL COMPASS
Has Commanding Officer Conduct Improved?
Captain Jason A. Vogt, U.S. Navy

Nobody trusts or has confidence in leaders who believe they cannot be
held accountable for what they do.

T

ADMIRAL JOHN C. HARVEY, JR., U.S. NAVY

he U.S. Navy continues to suffer from poor decision making among a small
number of commanding officers (COs), as demonstrated by continued
headlines: “Squadron Commander Relieved of Duty after Alleged Drunk Driving
Incident”;1 “Amphib [amphibious force] CO Fired, Source Says Linked to Alleged
Bribery Scheme”;2 “Sub Commander Relieved of Duty after Woman Alleges He
Faked Death to End Affair”;3 “Navy Investigates ex–Blue Angels Commander
after Complaint He Allowed Sexual Harassment”;4 and “Navy Skipper Abdicated
Command.”5 Since the publication in these pages in 2012 of Captain Mark F.
Light’s “The Navy’s Moral Compass,” individual cases of Navy commanding
officers making poor decisions of such kinds have continued to trouble Navy
leadership.6 Considering that more than 2,350 Navy billets are designated as
command positions, the infrequency of such events reflects the dedication of
most commanding officers.7 In fact, as Vice Admiral Thomas Copeman, addressing the specifics of a misconduct event as Commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S.
Pacific Fleet, wrote in 2014, “In my experience [the
Captain Vogt is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy and a career Surface Warfare Officer. An Anti- violations] are beyond rare; they are . . . wholly unSubmarine Warfare Specialty Career Path Officer,
representative of the supremely talented men and
he was commanding officer of Naval Ocean Prowomen filling positions of leadership.”8
cessing Facility, Whidbey Island, Washington. He
While it involves overall a statistically low peris a graduate of the Naval Postgraduate School, in
Monterey, California; the Naval War College (Com- centage of commanding officers, continued misbemand and Staff), in Newport, Rhode Island; and of
havior reinforces Captain Light’s assessment that
the Army War College, in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. He
it is a potential integrity issue for the Navy. In the
currently serves on the staff of the U.S. Fifth Fleet at
the headquarters, Commander, Naval Forces Cen- three years since the original article, substantial
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debate has occurred, and corrective actions have
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been taken by the Navy. Is it enough? Is it even
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moving in the right direction? This article reviews Captain Light’s findings and
updates his analysis with subsequent data; explains and assesses actions taken by
Navy leadership since 2011 to improve the quality of commanding officers; and
explores additional variables in today’s debate on commanding officer behavior.
Finally, the article presents recommendations to reduce future personal indiscretions by commanding officers.
THE MORAL COMPASS AND INSPECTOR GENERAL’S REPORT 2010
“The Navy’s Moral Compass” reviewed and analyzed data provided by the Career
Progression Division of the Naval Personnel Command (NPC) on CO “detachments for cause” (DFCs) from 1999 through 2010.9 These data sorted firings
into two broad categories (as resulting from professional or personal-conduct
reasons), then broke down the latter by community (air, surface, submarine,
etc.), rank, and duty type. Captain Light academically analyzed that material and
concluded that the Navy had to accomplish three tasks to elevate the quality of
the commanding officer corps and the character of naval leadership.10
First, Navy leadership had to establish a sense of urgency, not just to deal with
issues quickly (and publicly, to maintain transparency), but also to effect change
that would preclude unscrupulous actions in the first place. Second, he argued,
the Navy needed to set an ethical and moral standard (preferably in writing, as
the Army did in Army: Profession of Arms and the Army Operating Concept of
2010) to help create a shift in the Navy mind-set and culture as a whole.11 Finally,
the Navy had to improve the metrics, specifically the documentation, in periodic
evaluations under the Bureau of Personnel’s Fitness Report and Counseling Rec
ord, of potential moral shortcomings. Captain Light concluded with three recommendations, first that Navy leadership elevate the priority of ethical behavior,
establishing a central database of reliefs of COs owing to personal or professional
failures to facilitate tracking and analysis. Additionally, he urged them to undertake a campaign to set standards of integrity and honorable behavior. Lastly, he
argued, the officer fitness report ought to be modified in format and concept to
address character and integrity specifically.12
Concurrently with the original publication of “The Navy’s Moral Compass,”
the Navy Inspector General (IG) released a study on reliefs of commanding officers for cause.13 Focusing on firings between 1 January 2005 and 30 June 2010, the
report determined the Navy’s overall commanding officer DFC firing rate to be
low—approximately 1 percent per year, with a small variance from year to year. It
saw no correlation between CO DFCs and career paths, personality traits, accession sources, time in command, or year groups; however, it noted a preponderance of Navy-wide CO reliefs for personal misconduct.14 In personal misconduct
instances, it appears, fired COs either lacked the insight into their own motives
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss2/7
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and weaknesses that might have prevented unacceptable behavior or felt they
had the power to conceal the misconduct (the “Bathsheba Syndrome”).15 Furthermore, the study had found that implementation of four recommendations of
a 2004 Navy Inspector General DFC study had had no discernible impact on the
DFC rate (though the recommendations themselves were valid and represented
a solid foundation for long-term reduction).16 The 2010 report concluded with
three further recommendations. The first was to establish an officer leadership
training continuum from accession through major command, a continuum under a single “owner,” to provide consistency in curriculum development and execution. Second, improved oversight by immediate superiors in command (ISICs)
would better identify potential or ongoing issues earlier. Third, it recommended
that the Navy enforce existing requirements for Command Climate Assessments
and their executive summaries.17
ACTIONS AND REACTIONS
Whether in response to the two 2010 publications or, as a matter of coincidence,
to continued (and sometimes very public) CO failures, Navy leadership began
taking steps in early 2011 to address the trend. Admiral John C. Harvey, Jr., Commander, Fleet Forces Command, recognized that the majority of detachments for
cause of COs during his tenure had been for personal misconduct, a fact that he
confronted in a memorandum to his subordinates and through his official Navy
blog.18 This public acknowledgment was the first of several initiatives by senior
Navy officials to instill more honor and integrity in the position of commanding
officer.
The “Charge of Command”
By June 2011 Admiral Gary Roughead, then Chief of Naval Operations (CNO),
distributed a “Charge of Command”—a memorandum notifying current and
prospective commanding officers of his expectation that each of them would
meet the highest standards of personal and professional conduct while in command.19 Roughead’s memo addressed three essential principles he, as CNO,
considered to constitute the heart and soul of command: authority, responsibility,
and accountability. His document tied these principles both to the tradition of
naval command and to Title 10 of the U.S. Code, which speaks to the standards
of conduct by individuals in command.20 His successor, Admiral Jonathan W.
Greenert, reissued and reinforced the Charge of Command, requiring serving
and prospective commanding officers not only to review the memorandum but
to sign it with their immediate superiors as a compact between Navy leadership
and Navy commanders and commanding officers.21 This step created not only a
counseling opportunity and mentoring tool but also a contract between the Navy
and its commanding officers regarding personal conduct.
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015
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The Command Qualification Program
Admiral Greenert further codified the process of setting standards and identifying future commanding officers by introducing a Command Qualification Program.22 Released in June 2012 with an implementation deadline of 1 September
2012, the governing instruction plainly set out policy, procedures, and basic,
minimum standards for the qualifying and screening of naval officers for command. Until then individual communities had determined for themselves how to
go about selecting their future commanding officers. This autonomy had resulted
in sometimes widely varying criteria. Now, for the first time, the Navy applied
minimum standards across all officer “designators” (e.g., unrestricted line, Supply
Corps) and required, among other things, that potential commanding officers
be screened by an administrative board. In support of the Command Qualification Program, the Command Leadership School’s Command Course, required
for prospective commanding officers, instituted a written test covering tenets of
leadership, duties and responsibilities of commanding officers, and authorities as
laid down in U.S. Navy Regulations and the Uniform Code of Military Justice.23
Admiral Greenert further approved a Navy Leader Development Strategy, to
promote leader character development, emphasize ethics, and reinforce the service’s “core values.” The strategy called for a career-long continuum to develop
leaders and for a focus on character development to help young officers prepare
for command.24 The strategy led to the evolution of the Command Leadership
School into the Naval Leadership and Ethics Center (NLEC).25 Aligned with the
Naval War College, in Newport, Rhode Island, NLEC now develops curriculum
and performs assessment to instill the tenets of ethical leadership throughout the
Navy; to develop and guide leaders with a strong sense of responsibility, authority, and accountability; and to impart commitment to the Navy’s core values and
ethos to sailors.26 Vice Admiral Walter E. “Ted” Carter, Jr., now superintendent
of the U.S. Naval Academy but at the time a rear admiral and President of the
Naval War College, described the establishment of NLEC as “an opportunity
to take a more proactive approach in improving a culture of character development in conjunction with continued command leader education” with a goal of
“improved leader development.”27 With a consistent qualification program and a
focus at NLEC on ethical and character expectations, clear standards and expectations are now set for current and future commanding officers.
Command Climate Assessments
Recent events have brought renewed rigor to the Defense and Navy Departments’
Equal Opportunity programs, specifically regarding race, gender, and sexual
orientation and addressing issues ranging from hazing to harassment, assault,
and fraternization. One measure of the program’s effectiveness is the Command
Climate Assessment, a survey that should occur within ninety days after a new
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss2/7
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CO assumes command, with annual follow-up assessments during the command
tour.28 The Navy’s use of the Command Climate Assessment to support its equal
opportunity program goes back many years, with little change in responsibilities
defined for the ISIC and commanding officer.29 Unfortunately, over the years
many commands did not fully execute the program, typically using the results
largely for “internal consumption” and not making a priority to forward results
to ISICs. This resulted in inconsistent application of lessons learned. Two developments have refocused the Equal Opportunity program and renewed interest
in the Command Climate Assessment: the repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” and
increased scrutiny on the military’s Sexual Assault Prevention & Response program. These issues have made the Command Climate Assessment a useful tool
both within the unit and as a measure of that unit up the chain of command.
While the Command Climate Assessment cannot alone identify CO wrongdoing or personal misconduct, it can warn the ISIC to pay close attention to
individual commanding officers who may need assistance, guidance, or stricter
oversight. Such thoroughness by the ISIC would match the 2010 Navy Inspector
General’s recommendation that existing requirements for Command Climate
Assessments be enforced.30 Unfortunately, for a period after publication of the
report there were no assessments at all; contractual issues with the company
responsible for maintaining the servers involved prevented surveys for approximately six months in late 2012 and early 2013.31 With the resumption of surveys
has come renewed Navy leadership emphasis: commands now must use a “triangulation” method, utilizing multiple sources of information (e.g., the surveys
themselves, records reviews, and focus groups, interviews, and observations by
command assessment teams).32 Renewed emphasis on ISIC involvement, to include follow-up reports on actions taken in response to assessments, should make
the Command Climate Assessment a more useful tool in the future.
Reactions and Response
A consequence of the increasing importance of social media and “viral” networks
is nearly immediate discussion of changes or potential changes in the way business is conducted. This was the case with the Charge of Command; feedback
varied from strong support to outright aversion. The Association of the United
States Navy was quick to announce support: “Admiral Gary Roughead’s legacy to
the nation will be an inspiration to the officers and leaders that will follow him.”33
Some blogs condemned the document, one calling the Charge of Command
“a pathetic response to the real problem we have with COs being fired. Only a
fonctionaire [sic] thinks that a bit of paper can substitute for solid leadership and
a culture of honor and integrity—but that is the decision that has been made.”34
Military-interest publications such as Navy Times were quick to note each step to
improve leadership, with requisite editorial comment. Meanwhile, each CO firing
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015
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has continued to be a “front page” headline. Websites like SailorBob.com, a U.S.
Naval Institute–sponsored professional forum for Surface Warfare Officers, now
offer informal environments where members can discuss and argue about the
directions taken by Navy leadership, debate the conclusions of various studies,
and dissect each firing event.35 In this and other, similar forums hosted by naval
warfare communities, virtual peer pressure offers an additional deterrent to misconduct while individual events and issues are deliberated. However, debate and
opinion pieces do not sufficiently measure success. Continued analysis of commanding officer firings will be necessary to determine whether the adjustments
that have been made are meaningful.
2011–2013 DATA AND TREND ANALYSIS
The intention for this article was to update Captain Light’s data directly, by requesting DFC data for 2011 through 2013 from the source he used, the Career
Progression Division of the Naval Personnel Command. However, owing to
ongoing official investigations and the ever-increasing scrutiny of CO firings,
the data were not forthcoming. But comparable statistics can be collected from
other sources, including the Freedom of Information Act. Moreover, as the topic
of COs being removed from command has high visibility, firing events have been
documented by not only Navy Times but numerous websites, chat rooms, and
blogs.36
However, because not all firings result in formal detachments for cause, these
data would be likely to identify more firings than are officially documented by
the Navy, to which Captain Light’s work confined itself.37 It being understood
that this difference in data sources leaves room for challenge, this research attempted to maintain consistency by retaining previously determined definitions
and by considering all firings as potential DFCs. A list of fired commanding
officers published by Navy Times, the most public data for 2011–13, was used
as the baseline.38 A known disparity exists in data sets (for example, Navy Times
reports seventeen firings for 2010, NPC three), but to lessen its impact the analysis focused less on statistical specifics than on apparent trends potentially linked
to Navy actions.39
Figure 1 presents the total number of firings from 2010 through 2013. Firings
occurring in 2010 were addressed in Captain Light’s article; the 2010 data are
provided here only as a starting point. This analysis focuses on firings occurring
after the publication of the Charge of Command.
Using the definition of personal misconduct in the 2010 Inspector General
report and previously established categories, removals were sorted by cause as
“personal,” “professional,” or “unknown.”40 To make more specific the general caveats noted above, when NPC officially determines whether each removal in this
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss2/7
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data set is a detachment
for cause, several, those
30
not found to be DFCs,
may be removed. Ad25
ditionally, when all
20
now-pending Freedom
of Infor mat ion Ac t
15
requests are resolved,
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a number will likely
move from “unknown”
5
to another category.
0
Figure 2 breaks down
2010
2011
2012
2013
firings for personal,
Calendar Year
professional, and unknown (or unpublished) reasons. It can be seen that the number of “unknowns”
has increased in recent years. This is the result of a lack of detail provided in
reasons for firing, often simply “loss of confidence [i.e., on the part of a superior]
in ability to command.” It might be assumed that many firings categorized as
“unknown” for lack of published circumstances were actually for professional
reasons, for which the “sensational” personal failings that might produce detailed
media accounts would be absent. However, for this analysis, cases without those
details remain “unknown.”
Concentrating only on the firings for reasons identified as personal, the data
trend downward from a high of thirteen in 2010 to only five in 2013. Six of the
twelve firings during 2011 occurred after Admiral Roughead’s Charge of Command memorandum was published. Three of the six firings occurred within a
month of publication, leaving room for debate whether offending actions had
occurred before the
FIGURE 2
Charge of Command
FIRING BY TYPE: PERSONAL, PROFESSIONAL, UNKNOWN
was circulated. Break■ Personal
ing the data down by
14
■ Professional
community (figure 3)
■ Unknown
12
does not reveal any
10
trends or patterns, pre8
sumably because of the
6
decreasing number of
4
cases. As both Captain
2
Light and the IG report
0
found, no trends or
2010
2011
2012
2013
Calendar Year
patterns are apparent
CO Firings

Number of Firings

FIGURE 1
TOTAL COMMANDING OFFICERS FIRED
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in occurrences after
the Charge of Command with respect to
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rank of the individual
6
or whether an opera4
tional (at-sea) or shore
2
command is involved.
0
In every case involving
personal failings, the
Calendar Year
Calendar Year
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Other
havior, alcohol-related
6
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4
independent of profes2
sional requirements.
0
Given the shrinking
data set, therefore, it is
Calendar Year
Calendar Year
necessary to investigate
beyond community groups and explore individual cases for trends and linkages.
Since the Navy initiated steps to improve commanding officer accountability,
the trend lines have appeared favorable in terms of the goal of reducing firings
for personal misconduct. Though only a few years into the enterprise, the result
is indicative of the effectiveness of giving prospective commanding officers the
message regarding expectations of them while in command. Nevertheless, more
than thirty Navy COs have been fired for personal misconduct since the Charge
of Command was implemented. Why? This is a small number, considering the
number of commands and commanding officers in the Navy, but the reasons why
some individuals still do not “get it” merit further scrutiny.
Previous reports asserted that organizational culture plays no role in CO misconduct.41 Both the 2004 and 2010 Inspector General reports found no discernible correlations between career paths, personality traits, accession sources, time
in command, or year groups (i.e., year of commissioning).42 However, in contrast
to the shrinking overall number of firings per year and generally even distribution of firings across communities, one peak in recent data is worth noting as
an outlier—the aviation electronic-warfare community, comprising Electronic
Attack (VAQ) and Fleet Air Reconnaissance (VQ) squadrons. The VAQ and VQ
subcommunities account for approximately 10 percent of the Navy’s aviation
squadrons.43 Since implementation of the Charge of Command this subculture
has been responsible for half the aviation COs fired for misconduct (five of ten),
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17 percent of all misconduct CO reliefs between 2011 and 2013, and the first
Navy CO fired for misconduct in 2014.44
This anomaly could exist for any number of reasons. Given the relatively short
time and small numbers involved Navy-wide, it may simply be an unfortunate
coincidence. Or there may be a cultural divergence that either was not present or
went unrecognized during previous studies, some tendency that has developed
out of the culture, training, and ethos of a group that is stationed, when not deployed, at one location (the Navy’s VAQ subcommunity and the VQ squadron
where a firing occurred during the period reviewed are both based at Naval Air
Station Whidbey Island, in Washington). Or possibly this is a niche that simply
has not had enough time pass to absorb the new standards for commanding officers into its system. On the basis of standard patterns of rotations and promotions, the department heads who in 2011 witnessed their commanding officers
signing (among the first to do so) the Charge of Command have not yet returned
to be COs themselves. To know absolutely that every year group of every community understands and executes the Charge of Command may take between
four and seven years—a period the Navy is just now entering.
An instance that more obviously counters previous reports that organizational
culture plays no role is that of the Blue Angels. Although the officer recently
investigated for misconduct had already completed his tour in the squadron
and was in a subsequent noncommand billet when his reassignment occurred,
the causal events, described as his promoting a hostile work environment and
tolerating sexual harassment, had occurred during his tenure as CO.45 The investigation determined that while the CO was responsible, the organizational
culture had devolved into something from a bygone era. Pornography, lewd
comments, and raunchy pranks were widely condoned and tolerated, just “boys
being boys,” all under the direct observation of the commanding officer.46 The
inquiry resulted in not only the firing of the CO but a restructuring of the Blue
Angels organization.47
Nevertheless, neither organizational culture nor rationalization by individual
members can excuse actions that are clearly and plainly labeled inappropriate by
the Navy. With the implementation of the Charge of Command, misconduct by
a commanding officer comes down to a conscious decision. None of those fired
were in any doubt about what was right and wrong, not only in terms of Navy regulations but also, in the vast majority of cases, according to law, a moral code, or
both. Mechanisms are in place—training for prospective COs by the Naval Leadership and Ethics Center, the Command Qualification Program, the Charge of
Command, clear statements of the expectations for commanding officers and their
immediate superiors, and routine and standard Command Climate Assessments
—to minimize commanding officer misconduct. But more can be done.
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015
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A TRUE, LONG-TERM, AND SUSTAINABLE SOLUTION
To have no commanding officers relieved for cause would not be an achievable
goal; professional mishaps will occur that warrant holding a CO accountable.
But it is not unrealistic to strive to eliminate reliefs due to misconduct or individual ethical failure. The positive actions described here are good first steps. But
consistent enforcement of these topics and follow-up initiatives are necessary to
avoid a long-term appearance that the Navy’s response was simply reactive, a
“Band-Aid,” not a true, long-term, and sustainable solution. To continue to build
on the gains already achieved, the following recommendations are offered.
Be Transparent and Consistent, Navy
When the Navy attempts to move forward, it often proves its own worst enemy.
Two consecutive CNOs have placed the integrity of commanding officers high
on their priority lists and set standards of performance. Yet the public assumption is that “Big Navy” has something to hide—because commanding officers are
relieved without official statement about whether the reasons were professional
or personal. The ubiquitous “loss of confidence” leaves much to the imagination,
particularly in a social-media and blog environment where the allegation of hiding details results in overall loss of confidence in the broader establishment. This
lack of transparency is compounded each time a firing is not publicly acknowledged or officially tracked because it did not fit an administrative criterion (i.e.,
the financial parameters of a formal detachment for cause).
The 2010 Inspector General report acknowledged several cases of commanding officers relieved early that it could have considered but did not because the
DFC process had not been initiated.48 The IG investigation had no reliable way
to determine how often COs had been detached early but quietly, as if their tours
had been successful, when a DFC might have been more appropriate.49 Most
conspicuously, in 2003 when a reported twenty-six commanding officers were
relieved, only seven were listed by the Naval Personnel Command as DFCs.50
The combination of potentially inconsistent Navy data with Navy Personnel
Command unwillingness to release a comprehensive list makes evident a lack of
transparency concerning CO misconduct.
The way to rise above what does or does not constitute a DFC is to call it what
it is—a firing is a firing. Restricting official concern to reliefs that cost the Navy
money will, in the long run, erode trust in the service and bring its integrity
into question. The removal of commanding officers prior to projected rotation
dates should be addressed by ISICs whether they occur for operational reasons
or not.51 If a “no-cost DFC” category is created, future studies will have a more
comprehensive data set to analyze. The importance of dealing with all commanding officer firings was addressed in the 2004 IG report, though not in 2010. Such
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a complete listing might challenge the analysis of this article, but thereafter there
would be a consistent basis for future analysis, discussion, and debate.
Compounding the appearance of a lack of transparency was the Navy’s acceptance of the unavailability of Command Assessments for six months. Contractual
and budget issues were allowed to disable a leadership tool. The 2010 Inspector
General’s report had stated, “Command climate assessments would be a better
tool for commands if there was a broader understanding throughout the fleet” of
what assessments were and how to use them;52 not using them at all depreciated
them in the eyes of the fleet. Additionally, the IG had found that in almost all
the CO detachments for cause correct use of the assessments, especially accurate
executive summaries, would have highlighted early for ISICs the behavior and
command-climate problems.53 To have been denied the assessment process so
soon after it had been identified as necessary was a mixed signal.
Progress toward transparency would also be achieved by a more thorough
tracking system. In an age where baseball sabermetrics can track the actual (and
even predict potential) performance of individual players in specific situations,
the Navy ought to be able to track more closely the development of potential
commanding officers and performance of current ones. Correlating data not
only of firings but also leading to and during command tours—such as who had
worked for whom over the years and what had been said by and about individuals
in “360-degree” evaluations—might uncover linkages or trends not yet considered. No record now follows how subordinates of COs relieved for misconduct
fare in future positions or suggests whether there is any correlation to their own
future misconduct. While developing such a capability would be a herculean
task, it would be within the mission of the Navy’s Human Resources community,
specifically its Core Competencies of management and development.54 Until such
analysis is established and employed, public speculation, suspicion, and scrutiny
will continue.
Reexamine the Data
The Inspector General reports completed in 2004 and 2010 each took an objective look at the DFC process and came up with recommendations to address future commanding officer failings. For the reasons explained above, however, the
picture the reports presented was incomplete. While it provided enough clarity
for the CNO to determine that the Charge of Command, Command Qualification Program, and Command Climate Assessments were necessary, incompleteness of data may have the Navy chasing symptoms rather than a cure. It is time for
another official Navy review of not just the DFC process but any and all removals
of COs prior to their original rotation dates. A harder look at COs will produce
a more complete understanding of the effectiveness of current and future initiatives to eliminate personal misconduct that results in firings.
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015
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Establish and Enforce Dissuasive (Monetary) Measures
Despite any amount of training, formal setting of personal and professional expectations, or examples of colleagues who are relieved for their own misconduct,
the risks may not be high enough to deter those on the edge. When a commanding officer is relieved for individual failures, the topic quickly appears in articles,
comment sections of periodicals, blogs, and chat rooms. In almost every case
someone offers a variation on the statement “Commander X may no longer be
the commanding officer, but he will still get to retire with his twenty years, receive
his full pension, get a lucrative position outside the Navy, and other than some
fleeting embarrassment he will receive no real punishment.”
Command is the pinnacle of the military profession, and it is not a part-time
job. It is not conducted only during business hours. As Admiral Roughead once
said, commanders are duty bound to uphold strict behavioral standards, even
when off duty.55 Whether a commanding officer’s misconduct is deliberate (driving under the influence of alcohol, bribery, fraternization, etc.) or results from
failure to fulfill duties assigned or abdication of them (as occurred twice recently,
with the Blue Angels and the guided-missile cruiser USS Cowpens), the commanding officer remains responsible.56 As in other professions, a leader must
be held accountable when performance results in failure. In most professions
failure often results in removal of professional position and credentials, pecuniary penalties, or both. Doctors who do not perform adequately risk the loss of
their licenses and punitive judgments for malpractice. Lawyers can be disbarred
or sanctioned for demonstrated inability. Even midshipmen are held accountable
for failure once midway through their training; they owe time in service or, if
they cannot complete their training, must reimburse the Navy for the education
received.57 So what is the cost of the inability of a commanding officer to live up
to the commitment he or she accepted by signing the Charge of Command? The
Navy has often removed faltering leaders from authority but has not pursued
financial compensation for the time, training, and trust invested in them.
It is time to debate the question. The Navy should create a postcommand
screening board, charged with reviewing the details of individual firings. This
board would be independent of the relieved individual’s chain of command and
unrelated to any pending action under the Uniform Code of Military Justice resulting from misconduct. This board should have the power to recoup bonuses
from or impose other financial penalties on those who have made poor personal
decisions while in command. This does not mean that every failed commanding
officer would or should owe a financial debt to the Navy. For a purely professional
failure, the balance might be restored by removal of the individual from the command; an objective review by this panel might find no further action necessary.
But a personal failure, specifically misconduct, can be viewed as a breach of
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss2/7
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contract, an inability of the individual to abide by the Charge of Command. Many
commanding officer positions are designated as meriting additional pay or bonuses; the financial penalty could be simply requiring the failed commander to return them.58 Bonuses received in command (e.g., training or specialty bonuses or
flight, sea, nuclear, medical specialty, command-responsibility, or other criticalskills pay) could be considered insurance against poor decisions—refundable
security deposits by the Navy. Each firing would have to be reviewed individually, as each commanding officer represents a different level of investment by
the Navy in getting him or her to and through command. And just as the Navy
holds a midshipman responsible for failing to complete the course of instruction
leading to commission, so should the Navy hold responsible its commanding officers who fail to complete their command tours. For the more than 99 percent of
commanding officers who live within the Charge of Command and successfully
complete their command tours the hazard is nonexistent. Individuals considering
accepting the risk of misconduct may find in financial penalties the necessary
motivation to choose better—motivation that previous initiatives have not supplied. And even by preventing one firing, this option would take the Navy a step
closer to eliminating misconduct among commanding officers.
Since publication of “The Navy’s Moral Compass” the Navy has made progress
to reduce commanding officer misconduct. Progress has been achieved not only
by implementing new initiatives but also by ensuring that previously established
guidelines are properly executed, resulting in a solid basis for further reducing
commanding officer firings for misconduct in the future. Holding commanding
officers to a consistent and higher standard is necessary if they are to achieve
long-term success in the position, and until the number of misconduct cases is
zero, the pressure must be sustained. The Navy must continue to strive for a high
standard, improve transparency regarding its standards, continuously review
data trends, and scrutinize those entrusted with command. And it must improve
the process that identifies and tracks allegations when they arise—and then hold
individuals accountable.
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